Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 7, Issue 3

1983

Article 6

Aviation – Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention – Supreme Court Adopts a
Purpose Approach to Enforce an
Anachronistic Convention System
James K. Noble III∗

∗

Copyright c 1983 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Aviation – Article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention – Supreme Court Adopts a
Purpose Approach to Enforce an
Anachronistic Convention System
James K. Noble III

Abstract
This section discusses the recent Supreme Court decision in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp. whhich includes an approach to Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention which addresses
issues in aviation.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
AVIATION-

ARTICLE

22

OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION -SUPREME

COURT ADOPTS A PURPOSE APPROACH TO ENFORCE AN ANACHRONISTIC
SYSTEM- Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984).
CONVENTION

INTR OD UCTION
The Supreme Court's decision of April 17, 1984 in the case of
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.' is of great significance to all international air carriers and to the users of the services
they provide. At issue in Franklin Mint was the amount recoverable
3
2
by shippers for packages lost during international carriage by air.
The Franklin Mint Court was also asked to determine the proper
role of the Judicial Branch of the United States government in
4
enforcing and interpreting multilateral treaties.
This Recent Development begins with a discussion of the problems associated with continued adherence by the United States to

1. 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 690 F.2d 303 (2d
Cir. 1982).
2. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention], only applies to "international transportation." Id. art. 1. The term "international" is defined by the Convention as
any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the
place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in
the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that power
is not a party to this convention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping
place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to be international for
the purposes of this Convention.
Id. art. 1(2) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the current problems associated with the
interpretation of this article, see Note, Up in the Air Without a Ticket: Interpretation and
Revision of the Warsaw Convention, 6 FORnHAM INT'L L.J. 332 (1983).

3. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447.
4. See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit at point I, Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4445 [hereinafter cited as TWA
Petition); Respondent's Brief at point I, Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4445 (TWA arguing
that both petitions should be granted).

WARSAW CONVENTION

the unamended Warsaw Convention. 5 The Franklin Mint decision-the Supreme Court's first opinion on the Convention'-is
then examined. 7 Finally, other relevant developments and the need
for a legislative revision of the Convention system are discussed.,
I. THE WARSAW CONVENTION SYSTEM
"After the United Nations Charter, the Warsaw Convention is
the most widely adopted treaty."' Drafted at international conferences in 1925 and 1929, the Convention's principal purpose was to
provide the world's infant airline industry with a "legal basis" for
its operation.' 0 To achieve this purpose, the Convention "creates

5. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44. The United States adheres to the unamended Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, and has not ratified any of the protocols
amending this treaty. See, e.g., Guatemala City Protocol, Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613;
Protocol Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Protocol]; see also infra text accompanying notes 36-40 (Montreal Protocols, infra note 36,
failed to achieve the two-thirds vote required for ratification).
The continued adherence by the United States to the treaty is based upon a private
agreement called the Montreal Agreement. CAB Agreement No. 18,900, reprinted in 2 C.
SHAWCnOSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW D43-49 (4th ed. 1982) (with list of member carriers)
(approved by CAB Order No. E-23,690, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966)) [hereinafter cited as
Montreal Agreement]. See also infra text accompanying notes 21-40 (discussing the history of
attempts to amend the convention system).
The Convention's only official text is in French, and the "binding meaning of the terms
is the French legal meaning." Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F,2d 323, 330 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). By adopting the "principle of primacy of the French
legal system," the drafters hoped to ensure a uniform construction of the Convention provisions. See id. The rules created by the Convention are to be applied uniformly by courts of the
High Contracting Parties in all matters concerning contracts for international transportation
by air. Grein v. Imperial Airways, [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 74-75 (C.A. 1936). This Recent
Development uses the United States' translation found in 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876.
6. Prior to Franklin Mint, the Supreme Court had not delivered an opinion construing
the Warsaw Convention. Perhaps the closest the Court came to rendering such an opinion
was in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 390 U.S. 929, denying reh'g 390 U.S. 455
(1968), aff'g by an equally divided Court mem. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 45-100.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 101-21.
9. Brief Amicus Curiae of International Air Transport Association in Support of Petitioner Trans World Airlines, Inc. at point I(A) & n.9, FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4445
(citing A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 4.1, at 7-98 (2d ed. 1981)).
10. See SECOND INTE3NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW, OCTOBER 4-12, 1929,
WARSAW (MINUTES) 13, 18-23 (R. Horner & D. Legrez trans. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
MINUTES]. The need for a "legal basis" may be summarized as follows:
Private investors and insurance companies feared the uncertainty in the law
governing international flights. . . . Potential liability for a single accident was
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internationally uniform rules governing air carriage of passengers,
baggage and cargo.'''
The United States did not participate in the Convention's
drafting, sending only an observer to the international conference. 2 Five years later, President Roosevelt submitted the Convention to the Senate."3 In his message transmitting the Convention,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but
that it will prove to be an aid in the development of international transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a
more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance
rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a
reduction of operating expenses for the carrier and advantages to
travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportation
1 4
charges.

Without any floor debate, committee hearing, or report, the Senate
gave its advice and consent by voice vote on June 15, 1934.1 5 On

staggering. . . Moreover, litigation practices and laws would vary depending upon
where the suit was brought. . . . The Convention, by eliminating the uncertainty in
the law governing the contracts for international transportation, encourages the
parties to settle their rights and liabilities before the flight. The "legal basis" for
operation enabled the airline industry to obtain insurance and secure private investment ...
The Convention is often compared to the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1976) which limits the recovery for injuries resulting from nuclear power plant
accidents.
Note, supra note 2, at 335 n.16 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d
1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982); Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir.
1978); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089-93 (2d Cir. 1977); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498-501 (1967)).
11. See Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4446; Grein v. Imperial Airways, [1937] 1 K.B.
50, 74-75 (C.A. 1936); see, e.g., Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 3-16 (rules for
transportation documents); see also infra note 18 and accompanying text (liability limitation).
12. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4452 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules, S. ExEc. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934),
quoted in Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968).
14. Id.
15. 78 CoNe. REC. 11,582 (1934).
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July 31, 1934, the United States gave notice of adherence and, on
October 29, President Roosevelt proclaimed the Convention in effect as to the United States.' 6
Debate over United States participation in the Convention
began soon thereafter and has continued ever since. 17 Supporters of
the Convention have consistently maintained that international
uniformity and the Convention's limitation on liability protect both
the carriers and users of the services they provide. 8 The thrust of
the critics' attack since the 1950's has been against the Convention's
liability limitation. 19 Critics assert not only that the liability limitation is too low, but also that conditions in the airline industry have
changed so dramatically that no limitation can be legally, rationally, or morally justified. 2 °
As supporters and critics have continued to assert the same
arguments for over thirty years, the history of United States attempts to amend the Convention may be characterized as cyclical
inertia. In 1955, the Hague Protocol 21 amended the Convention by,
inter alia, doubling the amount recoverable by passengers to the
equivalent of U.S.$16,000. 22 The United States government, however, refused to ratify the Hague Protocol solely because the relief
provided was deemed inadequate. 23 In 1965, the United States
threatened that it would withdraw from the Convention unless the
limit on carrier liability was increased. 24 On May 14, 1966, the day

16. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
17. See Note, supra note 2, at 342-46.
18. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 534-35; Note, supra note 2, at 342
n.56. Aside from the Convention's principal purpose, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text, the reasons for limiting the carrier's liability include: (1) establishing an international
liability limit similar to that accorded shipowners; (2) spreading the risk of liability; (3)
allowing passengers to obtain insurance; (4) facilitating quick settlements; (5) unifying the

law with respect to the amount of damages, see H.

DIllON, LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 12-43 (1954); (6) obtaining the airline's consent to plaintiff's choice

of forum, see I L. KREINDER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.06 n.54 (Supp. 1981).
19. See supra note 18.
20. See, e.g., Report on the Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol, 26
J. AIR L. & CoM. 255, 268 (1959) (view of the dissenting members of the Comm. on
Aeronautics of the Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y.); see also infra text accompanying notes 2127, 31-37.
21. Hague Protocol, supra note 5.
22. See id. art. 11.
23. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1087 (2d Cir. 1977).
24. Dep't of State Release No. 268 (Nov. 15, 1965), reprinted in 53 DEP'T ST. BULL 92324 (1965) (notice of denunciation delivered to the Polish government, effective date May 15,
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before the United States denunciation was to take effect, the airlines agreed among themselves to accept a "special contract" increasing their liability ceiling to U.S.$75,000 for passengers departing from, destined for, or stopping over in the United States. 25 This
interim arrangement came to be known as the Montreal Agreement. 26 It was accepted by the United States, which withdrew its
27
notice of denunciation.
The Montreal Agreement, however, resolved the problem of
an unreasonably low monetary limitation only temporarily and
resulted in continued adherence by the United States to the unamended Convention. The number of problems associated with this
interim arrangement increased over the next few years. 28 In particular, three problems emerged from the unamended Convention's
form of liability limitation. 29 First, only the carrier is protected by
the limit placed on liability, and not other defendants such as
manufacturers and governmental units which are now sued in air
disaster cases. 30 Second, the Montreal Agreement set the carriers'
liability limit at U.S.$75,000. A fixed monetary figure cannot continue to provide reasonable compensation during inflationary pe-

1966). The Warsaw Convention achieved the two primary goals of the drafters: establishing
uniform rules concerning the contract of carriage, see Calkins, The Cause of Action Under
the Warsaw Convention, 26 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 323, 343 (1959); providing the legal basis of
operations which would enable an infant industry to obtain insurance and investment
capital, see Reilly, The Warsaw Ticket to Judicial Treaty Revision-Will We Do It Again?,
43 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 396, 397 (1969) (analyzing the effect of the Convention on the carriers'
liability exposure). The critics, therefore, asserted that the Convention had served its purpose
and was no longer necessary. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 20,164-65 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Robert Kennedy).
25. Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, § 1. See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra
note 18, at 552-601 (history of the Montreal Conference); Note, supra note 2, at 345 n.69
(noting the French view that the Montreal Agreement is both a tacit amendment to the treaty
and a violation of the treaty text).
26. Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, allowed the Warsaw Convention to remain
intact "pending the establishment of more permanent arrangements between the governments." Block v. Compagnie. Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
27. Dep't of State Releases Nos. 110-111 (May 13-14, 1966), reprinted in 54 DE,'T ST.
BULL. 955-57 (1966).
28. See Note, supra note 2, at 345, 356-58 & n.126.
29. Id. at 356 n.126; infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
30. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(203 suits by 337 decedents primarily against the manufacturer), cited in Reed v. Wiser, 555
F.2d 1079, 1091 (2d Cir. 1977). This development in the law was unforeseen by the
Convention's drafters. See MINUTES, supra note 10, at 20-22.
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riods. 31 The third difficulty is presented by article 22 of the unamended Convention, which sets the limit on carrier liability as
follows:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the
carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000

francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of
periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said
payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods,
the liability of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250francs

per kilogram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when
the package was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration
of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a
sum not exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that
sum is greater than the actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge
himself the liability of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000francs
per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to
the French franc consisting of 65[1/2] milligrams of gold at the
standardfineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may
32
be converted into any national currency in round figures.

In 1978, with the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act, 33 the
United States abandoned an "official gold price. ' ' 34 The problem

31. See Reilly, supra note 24, at 418-23 (suggesting that a workable amending procedure be adopted). "Adjusted for inflation, the real value of $75,000 in 1966 dollars is
approximately $25,000 in 1983 dollars." 129 Cong. Rec. S2246 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983)
(statement of Sen. Hollings); see also Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52
U.S.L.W. 4445, 4449 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984) (discussing the problem of the CAB's decision to
adhere "to a constant $9.07 per pound liability limit" during the inflation period between
1978 and 1984).
32. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22 (emphasis added).
33. Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660,
2661 (1976) (effective Apr. 1, 1978). For a discussion of this Act, see TransWorld Airlines v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4446-47 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984); Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 349-51 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
34. See Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4446-47. The last official gold priceU.S.$42.22 per ounce-was adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in its tariff
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presented, therefore, is how to interpret and enforce the Conven35
tion's gold clause.
In 1983, the Senate was again asked to vote on a proposed
substantial revision of the Warsaw Convention, known as the Mon-

treal Protocols.3" Supporters claimed that the revision would solve
two of the current problems. 37 Critics, however, again attacked
both the low amount recoverable 38 and the limit on liability in
general.3 9 On March 8, 1983, the Montreal Protocols failed to
40
achieve the required two-thirds vote for ratification.

requirements to convert the Convention's liability limit into United States currency. See CAB
Order 74-1-16, 74 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974). "Since 1978 the CAB has actively reviewed this
$9.07 per pound liability limit. As of 1979, however, the CAB continued to sanction the use
of the last official price of gold .. .as a conversion factor." Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at
4447 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the authority delegated to the CAB by Congress
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976), amended by 49 U.S.C. §
1551 (Supp. V 1981), see Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4446-47.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 48-100.
36. The Montreal Protocols are two related protocols, not yet in force, which incorporate all prior amendments to the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1. Additional Protocol No.
3 Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. Doc. No. 9147; Additional Protocol No. 4
Amending the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, Int'l Civ. Av. Org. No. 9148, reprintedin 2 C. SHAwcRoss &
M. BEAUMONT, Am LAw at A28-28A (status as of 1982) [hereinafter cited as Montreal
Protocols]; see also Note, supra note 2, at 360-62 (discussing the Montreal Protocols and
focusing on the changes in the Convention's ticketing requirements).
37. Note, supra note 2, at 360 n.146. The problem of a conversion factor would be
solved by establishing a new liability limit based on units of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
Id. See Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4446-47 (discussing the developments of the international monetary system and the Montreal Protocols). Supporters also contend that the problem of insufficient compensation to injured passengers would be solved by the addition of a
plan to provide U.S.$200,000 in insurance. See, e.g., Two Related Protocols Done At
Montreal: Hearingson Exec. A & B Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 58-63 (statement of Alan M. Fergusen, Vice-President, Prudential Ins. Co.) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Exec. A & B]. But this proposed insurance plan and that which was
proposed to accompany the Hague Protocol, supra note 5, have been strongly criticized. See,
e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 20,164-65 (1965) (Sen. Robert Kennedy analyzing and rejecting the
proposed system of mandatory insurance to accompany the Hague Protocol); Hollings,
Cheating Air Travelers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at 31, col. 1 (attacking the proposed
insurance plan to accompany the Montreal Protocols).
38. See, e.g., Hollings, supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., id. Critics also make a two-pronged attack against the Montreal Protocols'
removal of the Convention provision which bars carriers from relying upon the Convention's
limits on liability in cases involving willful misconduct. First, such removal shifts the public
interest arguments against the limitations, and threatens the constitutionality of the Convention. In the end, the United States could play the role of an insurer. See, e.g., In re Aircrash
Disaster in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that the Convention may constitute a "taking," thereby forcing the United States to provide the injured with
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Thus, the United States continues to adhere to the unamended
Convention, despite substantial problems of interpreting and enforcing this multilateral agreement. 4 l For example, because it was
never ratified, some have questioned whether the Convention is
technically a United States "treaty. '42 More importantly, United
States practice under the Convention yields little specific guidance
for courts attempting to interpret its anachronistic provisions.43 In
Franklin Mint, for example, the repeal of the gold standard left
both the interpretation and the enforceability of a major article in
the multilateral treaty open to question.44
II. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES V. FRANKLIN MINT CORP.
A. Facts and Lower Court Holdings
In March 1979, Franklin Mint Corporation, Franklin Mint
Limited, and McGregor, Swire Air Services (Franklin Mint) contracted with Trans World Airlines (TWA) for the carriage by air of
numismatic materials from the United States to England. 45 The
packages delivered to TWA were worth more than U.S.$6500, but
Franklin Mint did not make a special declaration of value.46 The

adequate compensation). See also 129 CONG. REC. S2250 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1983) (statement
of Sen. Hollings). Second, without the threat of litigating the "willful misconduct" issue,
carriers will be more reluctant to settle claims. See, e.g., Hearingson Exec. A & B, supra note
37, at 94-102 (statement of Lee S. Kreindler, Esq.).
40. 129 CoNG. REc. S2270, S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983). "On November 17, 1981, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported in favor of consenting to ratification."
FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447 n.18. But, led by Senator Hollings, the critics prevailed
when on March 8, 1983, "by a vote of 50 to 42 in favor of ratification, the Senate failed to
reach the two-thirds majority required for consent. The matter remains on the Senate
calendar." Id. (citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 98-1 (1983); S. EXac. Rio,. No. 97-45 (1981); 129
CONG. REC. S2270, S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
41. See Note, supra note 2, at 356-57; infra text accompanying notes 112-19.
42. See, e.g., Kennelly, Aviation Law: InternationalAir Travel-A Brief Diagnosis and
Prognosis,6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. (1975), discussed in Note, supra note 2, at 341-42 n.54.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
45. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1982),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part,.52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. Apr, 17, 1984). As both the United States
and the United Kingdom are High Contracting Parties, the transportation was "international" and the Convention applied. See supra note 2.
46. FranklinMint, 690 F.2d at 304. "Had such a declaration been made, and additional
fee paid, Franklin Mint would have been able to recover in an amount not exceeding the
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packages were lost and Franklin Mint brought suit to recover damages in the amount of U.S.$250,000. The parties stipulated that
TWA was responsible for the loss, thus the only question was the
47
amount of liability.
The district court ruled that under the Convention TWA's
liability was limited to U.S.$6,475.98. 41 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Knapp applied the last official gold price because it "has
been .. . espoused by the Civil Aeronautics Board ('CAB'), the

government agency most intimately concerned with transaction at
hand," and has been "used by all domestic carriers- including
TWA-in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation
' 49
printed on their tariffs.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but also
ruled that sixty days from the issuance of the mandate the limits on
liability would be unenforceable. 50 The court found that the Convention system required a factor for converting the liability limit
into dollars.5 However, because of the international disarray as to
a proper unit, and the lack of domestic legislation implementing the
Convention by establishing a unit of conversion, the choice of the
proper unit was left with the courts.52 As courts lack the authority
to make such a selection, the limits are unenforceable.5 3 In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected the CAB's choice of the last
official gold price stating: "While Congress may not have focused
explicitly upon the Convention in repealing the [Par Value Modification] Act, its purpose, abandonment of a price which was out of
touch with economic reality, plainly encompasses use of that price
to convert judgments to United States currency values."5 4 The court

declared value." FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4445 n.2 (citing Warsaw Convention, supra
note 5, art. 22(2), quoted in supra text accompanying note 32).
47. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4445.
48. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), afj'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S.
Apr. 17, 1984).
49. Id., quoted in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 305 (2d
Cir. 1982).
50. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1982),
afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984).
51. Id. at 309.
52. Id. at 309-11.
53. Id. at 311-12.
54. Id.at 311.
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55
also rejected the other alternatives: the free market price of 5gold;
7
56
Right.
Drawing
Special
the current French franc; and the

B. Importance of Franklin Mint
Whether the courts of the United States should enforce article
22's gold clause and, if so, what conversion rate should be followed,
are issues that go to the heart of the Convention. Resolution of these
'8
issues, however, left the federal courts in "complete disarray."
Moreover, the FranklinMint declaration of unenforceability caused
several foreign governments to express their view that United States

55. Id. at 310.
Neither the free market price of gold nor the current French franc was ever agreed
to by the treaty's framers, both are gross departures from its purposes, and as to the
latter, there is ample evidence that it was specifically rejected. The framers clearly
contemplated use of the governmentally fixed price of gold in adopting it as a unit of
account in the hope of providing stability. The free market price of gold, however,
is simply the daily fluctuating price of a commodity, affected by conditions relating
to supply and nonmonetary uses affecting demand. The current French franc is
similarly flawed. To enforce it would be a deliberate departure from the expressed
wishes of the framers to avoid the use of a single national currency subject to
unilateral action.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 310-11.
The inappropriateness of our adopting the SDR's as the unit of conversion is plain.
The Convention itself contains not the slighest authority for its use and the Senate
has thus far declined to ratify the Montreal Protocols. Moreover, the decision in
principle to use the SDR's is only the first step. After that, a further step must be
taken to define the limitation of liability in terms of a particular number of SDR's
per kilogram of baggage. In effect, we would have to set the level of the limitation.
Finally, the SDR is a creature of an international body, the IMF, and is subject to
modification or outright elimination by that body.
Id.
58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit at point I, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S.
Apr. 17, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Franklin Mint Petition]. See, e.g., Kern v. Northwest
Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 232, 239 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (rejecting the Franklin Mint approach in
favor of that used in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., 535 F. Supp. 833, 844
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (adopting the CAB standard)); accord Note, supra note 2, at 356-57 n.126;
see also In re Aircrash at Kimpo Int'l Airport, Korea, 558 F. Supp. 72, 74-75 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (citing Franklin Mint, but finding the Convention provision unenforceable in the
pending cases and stating that the parties presumptively knew that the "international disarray" would prevent the Warsaw Convention from shielding them from liability); Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1981),
(finding the limit set by the CAB null and void and adopting the free market price of gold).
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59
relations in international aviation would be seriously affected,
and raised a substantial question concerning the constitutional
powers of the judiciary to abrogate a major provision of a multilateral treaty still regarded by the United States as a "binding interna-

tional agreement. '"

These issues were presented to the Supreme Court as both
TWA and Franklin Mint petitioned for certiorari. 61 TWA "challenged the Court of Appeals declaration that the Convention's liability limit is prospectively unenforceable ....

Franklin Mint con-

tended that the Court of Appeals holding should have been
retrospective as well; 0' 2 that is, article 22 should be held unenforceable from April 1978.63 The Supreme Court granted both peti4
tions.6
D. Supreme Court's Decision
Justice O'Connor delivered the Supreme Court's first opinion
on the fifty-year-old Convention, which seven other Justices
joined.65 The Court concluded "that the Convention's cargo liability limit remains enforceable in the United States and that the
[conversion rate sanctioned by the CAB] is not inconsistent with the
Convention. Accordingly, [the Court affirmed] the judgment of the
Court of Appeals but [rejected] its declaration that the Convention
is prospectively unenforceable. "0 Justice Stevens, in a dissenting
opinion, agreed with the majority that although the "liability limitation is anachronistic in today's world of aviation, [the Court is]
obliged to enforce it so long as the political branches of the Government adhere to the Convention."6 7 Justice Stevens, however, dis-

59. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at
4445.
60. Respondent's Brief, supra note 4, at point II.
61. See Franklin Mint Petition, supra note 58; TWA Petition supra note 4. See also
supra notes 58-60.
62. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445-46 (U.S. Apr. 17,
1984).
63. Franklin Mint Petition, supra note 58; see also supra note 33 (the repeal of the Par
Value Modification Act).
64. See FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4446.
65. Id. at 4445-49; see supra note 6.
66. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4446 (U.S. Apr.
17, 1984).
67. Id. at 4453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agreed with the way the majority "enforced" the provision, 68 and
argued that the free market gold price is the only proper conver70

sion rate.

1. A Valid and Enforceable Treaty.
With little discussion, all nine Justice agreed that the Warsaw
Convention is a valid self-executing United States treaty. 71 "A treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later
statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly
expressed. '72 Thus, because "[n]either the legislative history of the
Par Value Modification Acts, the history of the repealing Act, [n]or
the repealing Act itself, make[s] any reference to the Convention,"
the treaty remains enforceable. 7 3
2. Change in Conditions Since Promulgation
Did Not Render the Convention Nonbinding.
Both the majority74 and the dissent 75 disagreed with Franklin
Mint's assertion that the substantial change in conditions rendered
the Convention nonbinding. 76 The majority stated:
A treaty is in the nature of a contract between nations. The
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does recognize that a nation that is
a party to a treaty might conceivably invoke changed circum-

68. See id. at 4450 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. See supra note 55.
70. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4453 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); accord Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, 531 F. Supp. 344, 352-53 (S.D. Tex.
1981).
71. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4447 (U.S. Apr.
17, 1984) (majority); id. at 4450 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Though the Convention permits
individual signatories to convert liability limits into national currencies by legislation or
otherwise, no domestic legislation is required to give the Convention force of law in the
United States." Id. at 4447 (majority). The Court, therefore, rejected the Second Circuit's
concern over the lack of implementing legislation. See id. See also FranklinMint, 690 F.2d at
309-311, discussed in supra text accompanying note 52 (Second Circuit's approach).
72. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447 (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
120 (1933)).
73. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Hammerschlag and Ellen Van Fleet in
Support of Franklin Mint Corporation at point I(B), Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1984) (arguing the doctrine of rebus sicstantibus).
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stances as an excuse for terminating obligations under a treaty.
But when the parties to a treaty continue to assert its vitality a
private person who finds the continued existence of a treaty
77
inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine on their behalf.
The dissenter also recognized that as long as the political
branches of government continue to adhere to a treaty, courts are
obliged to enforce it no matter how ananchronistic it may be.78
Justice Stevens stated: "The maxim that cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex [the reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also
ceases], applicable to the common law, does not govern the judici79
ary in cases involving application of positive law.
3. Application of the CAB-Sanctioned Conversion Rate.
The majority found that the Convention specified "liability
limits in terms of gold francs," but invited the "signatories to make
the conversion into currencies for themselves. In the United States
the CAB has been delegated the power to make the conversion, and
has exercised that power most recently in Order 74-1-16."8 0 Thus,
the Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's reasoning that the
repeal of the Par Value Modification Act constituted an abandonment of the unit of conversion specified in the Convention" that
required the court to "substitute" a new term. 82 Rather, the majority found that the issue presented to the Court was "whether the
CAB's Order is inconsistent with [either domestic legislation or] the
Convention.'"83
The majority believed that it was "clear" that no conflict
existed with domestic legislation. 84 However, the question of

77. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447.
78. Id. at 4453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 4447-48 n.25.
81. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 54 (Second Circuit's approach).
82. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447-48 n.25. See also supra text accompanying note
52 (Second Circuit's approach).
83. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4447-48'n.25. See also supra note 34 (discussing the
CAB Order).
84. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4448 (U.S. Apr.
17, 1984). "[W]hen Congress repealed the Par Value Modification Act it did not suggest that
the CAB should thereafter use a different conversion factor. Indeed, there is no hint that
either of the political branches expected or intended that Act to affect the dollar equivalent of
the, Convention's liability limit." Id. The Court, therefore, rejected the Second Circuit's
implicit abandonment approach, quoted in supra text accompanying note 54.
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whether a conflict with the treaty existed was ,"more debatable" 85
due to the "several and sometimes contradictory purposes" of the
liability limitation: 86
87
(1) "to set some limit on carrier's liability;
(2) "to set a stable, predictable, and internationally uniform
88
limit that would encourage the growth of a fledgling industry;
(3) "to link the Convention to a constant value, that would
keep step with the average value of cargo carried and so remain
equitable for carriers and transport users alike."'8 9
The majority found that the CAB's chosen conversion rate was
consistent with the first two purposes.90 With respect to the third
purpose, the majority recognized that "in an inflationary economy
a fixed, dollar based limit may fail in the long term" to achieve an
equitable result. However, the CAB's decision to "adhere, in the six
years since 1978, to a constant $9.07-per-pound liability limit" was
not inconsistent with the Convention. 9 ' In reaching this conclusion,
the Court examined "the conduct of the parties in implementing"
the Convention over the last fifty years and found that all "allowed
92
the value of the liability limit . . . to decline substantially.
Finally, the majority rejected the dissenter's "tying [of] the
Convention's liability limit to today's gold market [because it]
would fail to effect any purpose of the Convention's framers, and
would be inconsistent with well-established practice, acquiesced in
93
by the Convention's signatories over the past 50 years.

85. FranklinMint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4448.
86. Id. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 104-06 (Fifth Circuit noting the different
purposes of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, and the Montreal Agreement, supra note
5).
87. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4448.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 4449.
90. Id. at 4448-49.
91. Id. at 4449.
92. Id. See also Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signatureMay 23, 1969,
art. 31(3)(b), 8 I.L.M. 679, 692, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969). In the
interpretation of a treaty, "there shall be taken into account, together with the context...
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation." Id.
93. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4445, 4449 (U.S. Apr.
17, 1984). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.
1982), quoted in supra note 55 (Second Circuit's rejection of the free market price).
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In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's use of
the "purposes" of the Convention resulted in a "rewritten" rather
than an enforced article 22.4 Treaties, he asserted, are to be interpreted according to a "literal" approach,9 5 and read "in light of the
conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered
into."96 Focusing his attention solely on the gold clause, Justice
Stevens concluded that "[t]he plain language of the Convention, the
deliberations of the delegates, and the contemporary law of nations
leave no question as to the intent of the gold clause: 'Here what was
intended was to assure the payment of a money debt in dollars of a
value as constant as that of gold.' ,,97 Notwithstanding the change
in conditions that has rendered the gold standard a "relic," Justice
Stevens stated: "We are as obliged to apply the standard of value
agreed upon by the Convention as we are obliged to apply the
liability limitation. Indeed, of course, it is meaningless to attempt
to speak of one without the other; a liability limitation has no
meaning without reference to a standard of value."98 Thus, the
dissenter concluded, the rate of conversion is the market rate at
which the United States dollar exchanges for gold9 9 and the limit set
by the CAB "is void under Article 23 of the Convention which
nullifies '[a]ny provision tending to relieve [a] carrier of liability or
to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in this convention.' -100

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE WARSAW
CONVENTION SYSTEM
The Courts of Appeal for the Second and Fifth Circuits have
recently split on the question whether the Warsaw Convention
system allows an award of prejudgment interest above the liability
limitation in wrongful death actions. 10 ' In Domangue v. Eastern

94. Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4450 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Five Per Cent. Discount Cases, 243 U.S. 97, 106
(1917)).
96. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331-32

(1912)).
97. Id., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4452 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Norman v. Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 302 (1935)).
98. Id., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 23)).
101. See cases cited infra notes 102, 109.
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Air Lines,10 a unanimous Fifth Circuit held that "post-judgment
and pre-judgment interest may properly be awarded in addition to
the $75,000.00 limitation on judgments contained in the Warsaw
Convention and Montreal Agreement.' ' 10 3 The court stated that in
attempting to answer whether such an award is "inconsistent with
the purposes of Warsaw/Montreal . . . [an e]xamination of the
history of the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Agreement is
critical." 10 4 The court determined that the Convention's purpose
was to enable "an infant industry" to grow by allowing affordable
insurance protection, 0 5 and that the Montreal Agreement had the
additional and not entirely consistent purposes of increasing the
amount of compensation for injured passengers and encouraging
"speedy dispositions of claims."106 Adopting a balancing approach,
the court found the award of interest above the liability limitation
proper because it served the objectives of the Montreal Agreement
and did not defeat the Convention's initial purpose.10°7 The court
concluded that "if the drafters of the Montreal Agreement had
wanted interest to be included within the $75,000.00 limitation,
they could have so stipulated."' 0 8
The Second Circuit in O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines0 9 disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the Montreal
Agreement." 0 The O'Rourke court stated that "payment of pre-

102. 772 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 260-61 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 261 (citing Block v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 336 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968)).
106. See id. at 261-62.
107. See id. at 262-64 (postjudgment and prejudgment interest).
108. Id. at 263 (postjudgment interest).
109. Nos. 83-6065, 83-6071, slip op. at 2143 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 1984).
110. Id. at 2164-65 n.20 (noting that the Domangue decision had been rendered after
oral argument in O'Rourke). The majority also distinguished Domangue because in O'Rourke
plaintiffs sought "an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to state law." Id. (emphasis
added). But see id. at 2177-78 (Pratt, J., dissenting). The dissenter found that the "central
purpose" of Warsaw/Montreal was " 'to fix at a definite level the cost to airlines to cover such
damages.' " Id. at 2177 (quoting Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977)
(emphasis in Reed)). Such purpose would not be affected by requiring the carrier to pay
"interest on the $75,000 award from the time of the accident to the time of judgment." Id.
The dissenter agreed with the Fifth Circuit that, "[a]bsent any language in, or purpose
behind, either the Montreal Agreement or the Warsaw Convention that would preclude
interest, . . .prejudgment interest should be available to victims of air disasters who recover
under the Montreal Agreement." Id. at 2178.
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judgment interest would not advance any of the underlying objectives of the Convention or the agreement, but it would undercut"
the Convention's two major objectives:"' "to fix at a definite level
the cost to airlines of damages sustained by their passengers and of
insurance to cover such damages; . ..[and,] to establish a uniform

body of world-wide liability rules to govern international aviation." " 2 The court concluded that "[iun absence of any contrary
intent on the part of the framers, we may not read into [the
Warsaw Convention System] a provision that allows the payment
13
of prejudgment interest above the $75,000 liability limitation.""1
IV. THE NEED TO REVISE THE WARSAW
CONVENTION SYSTEM
The recent cases have once again pointed out the major problem associated with the continued adherence by the United States
to the unamended Convention: courts are faced with the difficult
task of interpreting and enforcing the treaty's anachronistic provisions."' This difficulty has arisen most particularly in cases involving the interpretation of the treaty's ticketing requirements, which
are often inconsistent with current industry practices." 5 In such
cases, courts have often attempted to apply the Convention by
rejecting a "literal" interpretation in favor of a "purpose" ap-

111. Id. at 2164-65 n.20.
112. Id. at 2162 (quoting Reed, 555 F.2d at 1089-90 (emphasis in Reed)). But see id. at
2177-78 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2164. But see id. at 2178 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 1, 58, 102, 109; see also Saks v. Air Fr., 724 F.2d
1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting "accident"), discussed in infra note 115; Note, supra note
2, at 356-58 (discussing Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1982) and the
problems courts face interpreting and enforcing the Convention's ticketing requirements); cf.
In re Air Crash Disaster at Malaga, Spain, 577 F. Supp. 1013, 1014-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(determining "place of destination" for purposes of Warsaw Convention, supra note 5, art.
28).
115. See, e.g., Stratis, 682 F.2d at 410-12, discussed in Note, supra note 2, at 346-58; id.
at 343 n.58 (citing Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S.2d
249 (1964); cf. Spain, 577 F. Supp. at 1014-15 (determining "place of destination" for
purposes of Warsaw Convention, supra note 4, art. 28). Cases requiring the courts to define
"accident" have also posed major problems for courts. See, e.g., Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384-90. In
Saks, the majority adopted a "purpose" approach to interpretation and held that permanent
loss of hearing allegedly caused by normal cabin pressure was an "accident." Id. at 1384-88.
The dissenter adopted a "literal" approach to interpretation and agreed with the Third
Circuit that an "unusual or unexpected occurrence" must be found for the carrier to be liable.
Id. at 1388-90 (citing DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (3d
Cir. 1978) (adopting the textual distinction between accidents and occurrences)).
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proach.11 6 The issue is not what the treaty requires, but which
purpose the requirement seryes today.\1 7 The obvious problem with
such an approach is that it often results in ad hoc judicial amendments that do violence to the text of the Convention.1 8 Courts are
not the proper forum for treaty revision.' 1 9
The problems presented by the present system suggest that the
United States should reexamine its current position.1 20 If the United
States is to remain a "High Contracting Party," a revised form of
12 1
the Montreal Protocols should be ratified.
James K. Noble III

116. See, e.g., Eck, 15 N.Y.2d at 59-60, 203 N.E.2d at 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52. See
also supra note 115 (discussing Saks v. Air Fr., 724 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1984)).
117. See, e.g., Eck, 15 N.Y.2d at 59-60, 203 N.E.2d at 642, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.
118. See, e.g., id. at 63, 203 N.E.2d at 644, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 255 (Desmond, J.,
dissenting); see also text accompanying notes 94-96 (dissenter in Franklin Mint arguing that
the Court's purpose approach effectively rewrote an article of the Convention).
119. See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977); see, e.g., In re Aircrash
Disaster in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). In Bali, the district court
found that the deregulation of the airline industry established a new federal policy that the
"vigorous airline industry [must] ... stand on its own feet." In re Air Crash in Bali,
Indonesia, 462 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 1978), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
Such a change in policy, the court reasoned, allows the courts to limit the treaty's enforcement. Id. This reasoning, however, misconceives the role of the courts in enforcing a
multinational treaty and was rejected by the circuit court. See Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308. For a
discussion of the district court decision in Bali, see Note, The Interpretationof the Warsaw
Convention in Wrongful Death Actions, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 71 (1979).
In his dissent in Franklin Mint, Justice Stevens wrote:
Some students of the Court take for granted that our decisions represent the will of
the judges rather than the will of law. This dogma may be the current fashion, but I
remain convinced that such remarks reflect a profound misunderstanding of the
nature of our work. Unfortunately, however, cynics-parading under the banner of
legal realism-are given a measure of credibility whenever the Court bases a
decision on its own notions of sound policy, rather than on what the law commands.
It does so today. The task of revising an international treaty is not one that this
Court has authority to perform.
Franklin Mint, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4455 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted),
120. See supra text accompanying notes 28-40; see also Note, supra note 2, at 356-64
(discussing the problems with the Convention's ticketing requirements and broad definition
of "international" as evidenced by Stratis, and proposing the ratification of a revised form of
the Montreal Protocols).
121. The revised Montreal Protocols should, inter alia, retain the Convention's "willful
misconduct" exception, see supra note 39, improve the proposed insurance plan, see supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text, or provide a workable amending procedure to adjust the
ceiling placed on liability during inflationary periods, see Reilly, supra note 24, at 418-23; see
also supra note 31 and accompanying text (present problem with Montreal Agreement); limit
the scope of the present definition of "international transportation" and substantially revise
ticketing requirements. See Note, supra note 2, at 362-64.
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